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Ever since 1948,Palestinian politics have been stymied by two conicting
drives: on the one hand the reality of an overwhelming imbalance of
power, which mandates major concessions, and on the other a deep
conviction of the unassailable justice of the cause, which refuses to accept
the dictates of power. Oscillating between these two poles, Palestinians
have been unable to develop a clear and consistent strategy. The rst
part of this essay, below, explores the ramications of this dichotomy in
the occupied territories, specically with regard to the development of the
Oslo process and the second intifada. A second part will explore how it
plays out in the case of the Palestinians of Israel.
THE OSLO AGREEMENT of 1993 appeared to open new horizons for the Palestini-
ans both in the occupied territories and in Israel. For those in the occupied
territories, it seemed to offer the prospect of a nal settlement based on a
historic compromise involving renunciation of their claims to Israel proper in
exchange for their own state on the territories of the West Bank and Gaza. For
Palestinians in Israel, it brought home the fact that their fate was henceforth
separate from that of their brethren in the West Bank and Gaza, opening the
way to their coming to terms with their own situation and becoming more
integrated into Israel. Both these trends toward a kind of “normalization”
with Israel broke down with the collapse of the Oslo process and the erup-
tion of the second intifada, which laid bare the deep contradiction that has
marked Palestinian politics ever since 1948—the push and pull of two con-
icting drives. On the one hand is the reality of an overwhelming imbalance
of power, which mandates major Palestinian concessions, and on the other
hand is the deep conviction of the unassailable justice of the cause arising
from the weight of history, which refuses to accept the dictates of power
and militates against concessions. Faced with Israel’s refusal to deliver on a
deal combining power and justice, the Palestinians are caught between the
two poles of power versus history, or the politics of the possible versus the
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imperatives of justice. The result is an impasse, a crisis of leadership, and a
seeming Palestinian inability to develop a clear and consistent strategy.
This two-part essay explores how the imbalance of power/justice paradigm
has played out in the occupied territories and within the Palestinian commu-
nity in Israel in recent years. In this rst part, I will discuss the case of the
Palestinians of the territories and attempt to show how the oscillation be-
tween the two poles affected the development of the Oslo process and the
second intifada that followed. The case of the Arabs of Israel, where the man-
ifestation of the power/justice dichotomy is less obvious but where a similar
mechanism is at work, will be discussed in part two.
First, however, it is necessary to analyze how the structure of Oslo that
emerged from the imbalance of power planted the seeds of its own collapse.
THE ASYMMETRIES OF OSLO: POWER VERSUS NORMS, AUTHORITY
VERSUS RESPONSIBILITY
One of the main criticisms of Oslo is that it was not grounded in any
normative standard or international law. The process was mainly a reection
of the balance/imbalance of power between the two parties, while issues of
historical justice—even relative—were set aside. In contrast to most cases of
decolonization, the end result of the process was not dened. Not only did the
accords not commit Israel to a total withdrawal from the occupied territories,
they also did not include any clear commitment on Israel’s part to stop the
construction of settlements. It is true that there was a vague reference in the
agreements to United Nations Security Council Resolution 242, which each
side interprets differently, but there was no mention of international legal
norms or UN resolutions establishing the Palestinian right of return. Com-
pounding the absence of substantive normative standards was the absence
of an honest broker to pilot the process, such as a UN body, but instead a
patently biased U.S. supervision. In other words, there was no law and no
judge, and everything was subject to power relations. In this context, it was
not surprising that the Israeli “interpretation” of each controversial point of
the agreement was invariably “adopted.”
Certainly, the Palestinian leadership had more than enough reasons to
claim that Oslo was the best that could be obtained given the overwhelming
imbalance of power: the neutralization of Egypt via the 1978 treaty with Israel,
the forced evacuation of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) from
Lebanon, the impasse of the rst intifada, the collapse of the Soviet bloc, and
the PLO’s marginalization following the 1991 Gulf War. Together these factors
formed a bleak picture that could excuse any bargain with Israel. So justice
and international norms were “bracketed,” or set aside.
Israel well understood the Palestinian impasse and exploited it to the
fullest. Throughout the entire process, Israel has acted solely from its power
position in a manner tantamount to diktat. At the same time, Israel was keen
on projecting to the outside world an image of the process as one of mutual
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consent amounting to a historic compromise. Thus, while the deal was made
on the basis of naked power, the outside image was one of normativity. It
was rape portrayed as a love story.
Despite the one-sidedness, the Palestinian leadership went along with the
image of “historic compromise” to avoid putting its weaknesses on public
display. The failure of the Oslo accords to provide even minimum elements
of relative justice was thus masked. In the leadership’s defense, however, it
could well be argued that at the early stages of the Oslo process the po-
tential gulf between the just and the possible was not so readily apparent
to the leadership itself, and that its eagerness to reach an accord may have
led it to rely on Israeli good faith to an extent not warranted by experi-
ence. Be that as it may, the Palestinian people, exhausted by the intifada
and ready to try a new direction, were encouraged to believe that the aws
of the agreement would be worked out over time. In this way the ground
was laid not only for the gulf between the “just” and the “possible,” but
also for the gulf that ultimately developed between the leadership and the
people.
The agreements that came out of such a power imbalance were, inevitably,
very much weighted in Israel’s favor. While the PLO recognized in the name
of all Palestinians Israel’s right to exist, Israel did not recognize the substantive
rights of Palestinians: neither their right to self-determination within the 1967
borders, their right of return, nor any other rights spelled out in a host of UN
resolutions. Instead, Israel merely recognized the PLO as the representative of
the Palestinian people—in other words, as an entity empowered to recognize
Israel.
But representation is only a tool, not the thing in itself. To be representative
means to have the ability and the power to speak in the name of others. But
it also means having the power to make demands and concessions in the
name of those represented. As such, representation is a sword that can be
used both by and against the represented. It allows the Palestinians to march
forward, but also backward.
This being the case, Israel’s mere recognition of the PLO as representative
of the Palestinians is completely meaningless. Indeed, the Israeli recognition
of the PLO was already implied in the PLO’s recognition of Israel, since the
PLO’s recognition of Israel would be meaningless if it didn’t represent all
Palestinians. At the time of Oslo, then, it was in Israel’s interest to acknowledge
the PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinian people.
The result of this substitution of process for substance, and tools for con-
tent, was disastrous for the Palestinians. What it meant was that the Palestini-
ans recognized Israel’s 1967 borders while Israel itself did not recognize or
commit itself to these borders. Thus, during the negotiations, the 1967 bor-
ders constrained only the Palestinian demands without imposing any limits on
Israel’s territorial demands; for Palestinians traveling from Nablus to Tel Aviv
there were borders, while for those moving from Tel Aviv to Nablus these
borders disappear. So while Israel achieved its basic goal merely by signing
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the agreements, the Palestinian goals were to be discussed only during the
negotiating process.
This asymmetrical situation created a reality where the issue under ne-
gotiation was the disposition of the territories occupied in 1967. While any
reasonable solution could only be based on dividing the whole of historical
Palestine between the two peoples (or on instituting a binational or secular
state), Oslo created a mental framework whereby the cake to be divided was
the occupied territories, now portrayed as “disputed areas,” with each party
having its own legitimate claims to parts of the land.
Given this understanding, it is no wonder that Israel at the Camp David
summit of July 2000 succeeded in portraying the Palestinians as the stubborn,
uncompromising party. The Palestinian insistence on “all” the occupied terri-
tories was seen as “intransigent,” “radical,” “extreme.” For the Palestinians to
appear moderate they would have had to agree to normalize the occupation
and to accept its continuation under other names. The fact that the Pales-
tinians had already made their historic compromise by signing the agreement
itself, thereby renouncing 78 percent of their homeland, was completely over-
looked, and the earlier major concessions were not counted when the two
parties sat down to the nal status talks.
Israel conditioned the signing of a nal agreement at Camp David upon
a clear Palestinian statement relinquishing any further claims against Israel
arising from the 1967 or 1948 wars, including the right of return. Thus, while
Israel limited the parameters of the negotiations to the territories occupied in
1967, when it came to the nal settlement it demanded that the Palestinians
give up their rights with regard to issues concerning 1948 that were excluded
from the negotiations. In other words, the Palestinians were required to give
up rights that Israel had not recognized in the rst place. Israel insisted that
the Palestinians give up the right of return while denying that the Palestinians
had such a right. Otherwise stated, Israel removed from the table questions
they had not allowed to be brought to the table. This might be called buying
Is ra e l wanted to g ain a
h is to r ic c ompromis e
w ith out dea ling w ith
h is tory , and wanted to
up ro o t the caus e s o f the
c on ic t w ithout ex po s ing
the s e ro o ts .
1948 for the price of 1967. Israel wanted to gain a
historic compromise without dealing with history, and
wanted to uproot the causes of the conict without ex-
posing these roots.
The asymmetries touch every aspect of the agree-
ments. They established the Palestinian Authority (PA)
to govern those parts of Palestine from which Israel
would withdraw. But in fact, as has often been noted,
the PA has authority only over the people, not the land.
Thus, under Oslo, Israel was able to build new settlements, to use water
resources, and to build bypass roads all over the occupied territories, as
if there were no PA at all; for all these purposes Israel acted unilaterally
without the consent of the PA. And when Palestinians resisted the Israeli ac-
tions and took to the streets in protest, Israel demanded that the PA suppress
them.
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What all this meant was that Israel continued to act as the real sovereign
over the land without bearing the responsibilities of a sovereign toward the
population. Conversely, the PA lacked sovereign powers even while being
asked to act as if it were the sole sovereign. In other words, Israel had au-
thority without responsibility, while the PA had the responsibility without real
authority.
With the PLO’s collapse into the PA, the Palestinians expected the PA to
continue their project of liberation, which entailed above all the dismantling
of the settlements. Yet under the Oslo accords, the PA was supposed to take
action against Palestinians acting against settlers; otherwise stated, the PA was
responsible for protecting the settlements. Here we see the contradictory role
of the PA as heir to the PLO, seen by the people as a liberation movement, and
the PA as a kind of guarantor of Israeli security. What this boils down to is that
the PA was called upon to be, simultaneously, an element of instability as a
liberation movement, and an element of stability within the Oslo framework.
In short, the PA had to be, and not to be, at the same time. What is the nal
strategy here?
ISSUES OF STRATEGY
What is of special interest to me in the formulation of the Oslo agreements
is Palestinian strategy, or the lack thereof. The question can be raised as to
how, given the crushing imbalance of power, the Palestinians might have
acted differently. To what extent did they seriously consider the concessions
they made? Concerning the recognition of Israel, for example, were all the
options considered? And in the broader context, what exactly are the compo-
nents of power? Is only naked military force to be considered, or might power
also include moral weight, the recognized justness of the cause, and readi-
ness to sacrice? The issue here is not to judge whether or not Israel should
have been recognized, but rather to explore, in the latter event, how it might
have been recognized to best serve Palestinian interests, what the Palestini-
ans might have obtained in return, and whether this recognition was part of a
larger strategy. Was recognition reversible in the event that Israel did not de-
liver what was expected of it during the nal status negotiations (and indeed,
from the outset it was clear that many of the settlements would not be evacu-
ated)? And is there, in the rst place, such a thing as a reversible recognition?
The PLO and then the PA bracketed these and other questions relating to his-
tory and justice, and those who dared raise them were branded as extremists.
Another example might be Oslo’s requirement that the Palestinian charter
be amended to delete the sections denying the existence of Israel. Considering
the charter’s almost sacred place in Palestinian history, it was amended with
an almost unbearable lightness, with almost no signicant debate within the
PLO (by then virtually subsumed within the PA). The imbalance of power had
been internalized to such a degree as to dictate not only future solutions but
also a rewriting of Palestinian history.
44 JOURNAL OF PALESTINE STUDIES
I would like here to give a concrete example of how a different strategy,
combining justice with politics and history with naked power, might have
been followed during the Oslo years. Let us imagine that the PLO, when
asked to change the Palestinian charter, had made it clear that it would do
so only if Israel declared that it had no territorial claims in the occupied
territories. Or that it had declared readiness to recognize Israel’s borders and
right to exist only if Israel itself recognized these borders. Such conditions
could easily be supported with historical and moral arguments, and could
even have been supported to an extent by the premises of the Oslo accords
themselves. Whatever Israel’s response, such conditions would have initiated
heated debate within Israel and the international community. And whether
or not such an approach was “reasonable” or likely to produce a speedy
agreement, it would certainly have signaled that the Palestinians took their
recognition of Israel seriously instead of simply yielding to the imbalance of
power.
Similar remarks apply to the declaration in the Oslo documents concern-
ing a Palestinian ”renunciation of terror” (note: not denunciation but renun-
ciation). There was apparently no consideration of what would happen if
Israel refused to evacuate settlements or release prisoners, denied access to
Jerusalem, and so on. What tools would be left in Palestinian hands with
which to carry on the struggle against Israeli occupation? If the Palestinians
themselves call their earlier struggle ”terror,” then what could they expect
the international community to call violent actions against Israeli settlements
in the event the talks collapsed? Should the Palestinians then have to refrain
from any violent action, even if Israel refused to honor its commitments under
Oslo?
Such questions, which regrettably were never seriously entertained by the
Palestinian leadership, ceased to be academic with the collapse of the Camp
David summit in July 2000. Indeed, the Oslo years had created a misconcep-
tion of reality. The de facto situation was that Israel had replaced an explicit
occupation with an invisible one. And after years of talks, when it had be-
come clear that the occupation was continuing by remote control even as
the settlements had doubled, the Palestinians found that any resistance using
the conventional methods of the rst intifada had become almost impossible,
both physically and politically—physically because the occupation was no
longer visible in the form of soldiers patrolling the streets, and politically be-
cause the mere existence of the PA gave the impression of relations between
two states and fostered the illusion that a post-conict agenda had been en-
tered into, even as the real issues had been deferred. In other words, the
world—including the Israeli Left—was living under the impression that the
Palestinians had already achieved their independence.
Thus, when the second intifada erupted, the Palestinians were, in a way,
trapped. Having “renounced terror,” they could not nd a vocabulary to ad-
dress the international community. The rst intifada had been viewed by the
world at large as an act of liberation aimed at ending an occupation, and
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this ultimately led to what was understood as a peace process. The second
intifada came against the background of the so-called peace process, and has
been widely understood as a negation of peace. So while the rst was under-
stood as being conducted by an occupied people, the second is understood
as being conducted by a state, and hence as an act of aggression rather than
an act of liberation. Within the new context, the Israeli occupation has been
perceived as “normal” and the Palestinian resistance as “terror,” while peace
has come to mean simply the absence of violence, which means the absence
of resistance, which means the continuation of the status quo, which means
the continuation of the occupation. In this way, peace has been divorced
Ins tead o f p ea c e be ing
the outc ome o f jus tic e and
freedom, it be came th e pre -
conditio n fo r ne g o tia tio n
w ith Is ra e l.
from justice and freedom, and instead of peace being
the outcome of justice and freedom, it has become the
precondition for negotiation with Israel.
To sum up, the Oslo years were marked by the
Palestinian leadership’s total internalization of the im-
balance of power, which led it to mufe considerations
of justice and history. But here, I think, the leadership
underestimated its own possibilities in the sense that the justness of the cause,
if incorporated into the political struggle, would constitute an important el-
ement in the overall balance of power. Instead, two completely separate
spheres have evolved: one of justice (ignoring politics) and the other of poli-
tics (excluding justice). So the Palestinians were left with one of two options:
to preach justice without any plan of action, or to act with political prag-
matism without heeding the voice of history and justice. But history cannot
evaporate, and if thrown out the window it will come back through the front
door. This leads me to the second moment: the new intifada.
THE NEW INTIFADA: THE REASSERTION OF THE POLE OF JUSTICE
The outbreak of the new intifada signaled a new phase of Palestinian poli-
tics, when the dynamic of the imbalance of power employed by the leadership
gave way to a reassertion of the demand for justice coming from the people.
Here we see that the dichotomy of “power” versus “justice” overlaps with an-
other dichotomy, that of “the leadership” versus “the people.” How did this
happen?
As the Oslo years went on, with the proliferation of bypass roads fragment-
ing the ever-shrinking territory, the doubling of settlers, and the devastating
effects of the closures, mounting Palestinian frustrations were compounded
by increasing fears that the PA leadership was willing to make historic conces-
sions without substantial returns: for the people, and despite the overwhelm-
ing imbalance of power, the clear justice of the cause could not bear any
more concessions. Meanwhile, the ease with which the PA made concessions
had created among the Israelis (some in good faith, many in bad) the false
impression that there was no limit to Palestinian concessions, an impression
fueled by the fact that Israel had been able to step up its settlement building
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during the negotiations without provoking any serious protest on the Pales-
tinian side. From here to the second intifada was but a short step, and the
rhetoric of justice was left to Hamas.
In the lead-up to the outbreak of violence, the growing Palestinian anger
against Israel was compounded by alienation from the PA for the falsely rosy
images of the future it had held up to them. There was also the sense that the
Palestinian population’s opinions with regard to the nal status issues had
been ignored. Israel had promised to bring any agreement with the Pales-
tinians to a national referendum, but the PA had made no such commitment
(not to mention the fact that the required new Palestinian parliamentary elec-
tions had been delayed). This was no accident, since the leadership knew
very well that the peace that Israel had in mind would not be accepted by
the Palestinian majority: indeed, the likely deal presupposed the absence of
popular Palestinian participation. It is true there was a great deal of public
debate within the Palestinian community, at least at the elite level, regarding
nal status issues, but it never moved from the domain of discussion to the
level of decision—in other words, there was no effective political institutional
mechanism of decision making.
The second intifada, then, represents the swing from the pole of the im-
balance of power (leading to pragmatism, the peace process) to the pole of
justice and history (where the “pragmatic” compromise is rejected). For the
outbreak of the second intifada did not arise from a misunderstanding, but
from a resounding Palestinian popular “NO” to the Israeli diktat. Because of
the lack of a political process capable of reecting Palestinian popular sen-
timents, these found expression in violence: lacking political channels, the
people said “no” with their blood. Indeed, the most dramatic embodiment of
the second pole at work is the suicide bombers.
Such desperate actions fed on the public’s exacerbated frustration and
indignation at the increasingly obvious lack of minimal justice as the process
unfolded. This is not to say that Oslo was rejected only by those sending
suicide bombers. Many Palestinians, including many who subscribed to the
two-state solution, had been highly critical of Oslo from the outset because
of their doubts that the process could lead to this goal. But the absence of
a functioning mechanism within the Palestinian political structure capable
of translating these opinions into political action created a situation where
Palestinians were either with or against the PA. Small wonder that in this
reality, and with the fast deteriorating situation on the ground as the process
continued, the more radical groups like Hamas became a symbol and an
address.
Thus, the point I want to make is not that the Palestinian leadership
adopted the intifada as a new strategy, nor that the leadership had in any
way been behind the intifada, but that the Palestinian people, with their sense
of justice, reacted to the Israeli provocation. In this sense I would say that
while the leadership went to Oslo disregarding the people, and therefore had
to conduct its negotiations in secret behind closed doors, the new intifada
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found the people disregarding the leadership. And while the Oslo accords,
in ignoring justice, represented the supremacy of the imbalance of power,
the second intifada, coming from the people, was an attempt to assert justice
while being blind to the imbalance of power.
The last two years, fraught with contradictions, have only exacerbated the
lack of an overriding strategy. Instead of reinforcing each other, the resistance
action on the ground and the political action (and statements) by the leader-
ship undermined one another. The PA is denouncing “violence” even while
attempting to use it in the negotiations; in so doing it delegitimizes both its
own powers and the resistance. The same holds true for the resistance actions
which, carried out without any clear context or political cover, work against
the leadership and undermine its legitimacy and power to rule. The result
is that those who have some power on the ground are not negotiating, and
those who are negotiating have no real power. Israel will always have the
excuse not to negotiate. Israel, in order to embarrass the PA, can point to
Hamas or even Fatah activist actions, and in order to embarrass Hamas or
Fatah activism, can point to PA words.
Would the result have been different if the PA had acted differently, that
is to say, could some kind of an intifada have been avoided? I tend to think
not, insofar as Israel was clearly not prepared to make the kind of offer
needed to satisfy the Palestinians’ minimum requirements of justice and had
an interest in a return to a zero-sum game. What would have been different is
that when the hour of truth had struck, when the talks had broken down and
the violence erupted, the violence would more likely have been seen as an
uprising against occupation rather than, as now, a war between two states.
In such a context, the PA could have led the intifada with a clear agenda,
instead of being led, directionless, by the intifada.
THE ONGOING IMPASSE
The Palestinians of the occupied territories have shown, despite the crush-
ing imbalance of power between themselves and Israel, an extraordinary
capacity to resist the Israeli diktat, and have refused time and again to re-
nounce their struggle. There is no doubt that the driving force behind this
will to resist is their clear sense of a just cause. This sense of justice feeds
and nourishes their resistance and allows them to go on despite terrible costs
and almost unimaginable hardships. Yet at the same time, it is precisely this
notion of justice that makes it so difcult for them to go forward in the sense
of developing a clear strategy likely to reach a solution, which, by virtue
precisely of the tremendous imbalance of power, will necessarily involve im-
portant concessions. For the Palestinian case is so unambiguously just, their
claims and rights so unassailable under any standard of justice and interna-
tional law, that virtually any concession is like cutting into esh and bone.
Thus, while the justness of the cause is a shield against surrender, it also
acts as a kind of shackle, because moving forward means bargaining, which,
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given the price already paid, is not an easy thing to do. The Palestinians are
surrounded by the justness of their cause: everywhere they look it is staring at
them.
A qualication at this point is necessary. The problem is not whether the
Palestinians would accept a reasonable offer—which, by the way, the Israelis
have never made and which would include a Palestinian state in all the oc-
cupied territories, evacuating all settlements, dividing Jerusalem, and right of
return (though mainly to the Palestinian state). My guess, and this is only a
guess, is that a large majority of the Palestinian people would accept this. But
the problem is not whether this is an offer that they could accept, but whether
this is an offer that they could make, to which they could commit themselves
in advance and then adhere to consistently. Here my guess is that the answer
is negative, for the reasons discussed above. The difculty of “swallowing”
the concessions such a deal would entail would prevent them from articu-
lating it as a clear goal and making it the linchpin of their strategy—as did
the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa, for example. There, the
terms of the bargain (which also involved substantial concessions, such as
recognizing white ownership of vast swaths of the country’s territory) were
set ahead, rmly placed on the table as a standing offer from the blacks to
the whites. This clarity and consistency allowed the ANC to develop a strat-
egy to which its actions were subordinated. This clarity and rmness won
for the ANC the respect and condence of friends and adversaries alike. The
approach put pressure on the white community even while offering it a way
out of the historical impasse.
Certainly, there is no easy solution to the Palestinian dilemma. The Pales-
tinian failure to achieve even minimal or relative justice arises from their
weakness vis-a`-vis Israel and its powerful supporters (sponsors?) as well as
from their reluctance to turn their weakness into strength by adopting “slave
morality” (in the Nietzchean sense) as a strategy for gaining power. In order
to try to bridge the gap between realities and representations, between the
leadership and the people, between what is just and what is possible, I can
offer only very general prescriptions. If we do not know the right answer
to these dilemmas, at least let us know where to look for it: in the popular
will of the Palestinian people. This means building transparent and account-
able Palestinian institutions that would be the reference for any future talks
and responsible for long-term Palestinian strategy. Such institutions, which
could be a crucible of contradictions, need to replace the often-improvised
unilateral politics—whether the secret talks in sealed rooms that character-
ized the Oslo process, or the suicide bombers who have come to symbolize
the second intifada. What the two poles have in common is lack of popular
participation and institutional decision-making; as such, both are bad ways of
making politics. The rst nds justication in the imbalance of power, the sec-
ond in the patent injustice of the proposed solutions. Without transparent and
democratic institutions, themes of power and justice will continue to alternate
instead of being integrated. The resort to political institutions reective of the
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popular will is the only way to turn what is just into something possible, and
what is possible into something just.
The result of bracketing justice and ignoring the weight of history has
been to underestimate the Palestinians’ overall power, for power is not only
brute strength but also includes elements of justice and a people’s readiness
to endure and suffer. This underestimation of power in turn has led to the
tendency to see every small gain in the peace process as an achievement (as
if we had not already paid the price in advance) and has blinded us to the
fact that the Palestinians are a source of fear to Jewish Israelis. And the source
of this fear and perception of threat derive less from suicide bombers than
from an Israeli realization, however suppressed, that the Palestinian cause is
just. It is only by considering all elements of the power equation that a sound
Palestinian strategy can be devised, without which we will be doomed to
continue to oscillate between outbursts of anger expressing the demand for
justice, and unrestrained secret talks ruled by the imbalance of power.
In this essay I have concentrated on the Palestinian side. Unfortunately,
one cannot discern on the Israeli side any sign that might justify hopes for a
historic compromise. This does not mean that the two sides will not be able
to reach some arrangement, even a long-term arrangement, but this is not to
be confused with anything resembling a historic compromise.
